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THE BOLD SPIRITS HAVE CONQUERED: HEDLEY, BYRNE
CO. v. HELLER.
J. A. WALKER"'
The bold spirits have conquered; the timorous souls are vanquished.
The House of Lords has recently re-examined the principle of liability
for negligent statements and as a result has extended the scope of
such liability. This extension was the result of a long development
of the law. Thirty years passed since Donoghue v. Stevenson1 and
forty years since the American courts recognized liability for negli-
gent misstatement.2 The case of Hedley, Byrne & Co. v. Heller3 estab-
lished the principle which had been evolving over the years, but it
has not cast aside the fears that had plagued the judiciary for cen-
turies.
Exponents of freedom of speech had successfully maintained that
words were not as harmful as physical acts and so liability should not
attach to negligent words. About 1800, the courts began to recognize
a general duty of honesty in speech.4 The argument against the exten-
tion of the duty to the realm of negligence was based on the supposed
protection of freedom of speech, the reason reflecting the laissez faire
philosophy which permeated all aspects of society.
It was not until after Donoghue v. Stevenson5 that the courts
began to accept the principle that in certain circumstances words
must be treated similarly to acts. Writers and judges argued that lia-
bility attached in Donoghue v. Stevenson not so much for allowing
the snail to get into the bottle as for permitting the bottle to give an
appearance of safety.6 As a result, the courts started to extend lia-
bility to situations where the negligent statements resulted in physical
harm to the plaintiff.7 Gradually as the distinction between negligent
words and acts began to blur, the proponents of limited liability for
negligent mis-statement shifted the field of battle from the cause of
by any other party thereto or person bound thereby who is injured or suffers
damage as a result of the breach.
(3) For the purposes of suing or being sued as permitted under this
Act, employers' organizations and trade unions are legal entities capable of
suing or being sued.
The British Columbia Trade-Unions Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 384, s. 4(1)
and s. 7(2) are expressed in similar terms.
If Ontario were to enact this type of legislation there would be no need
for retaining s. 3(2) of the Rights of Labour Act. (The grounds for trade
union liability need not be as wide.)
*Mr. Walker is a student in the second year at Osgoode Hall Law School.
1 [19323 1 All E.R. 1.
2 Glanzer v. Shephard, (1922), 233 N.Y. 236.
3 [196332 All E.R. 575.
4 Pasley v. Freeman, (1789), 100 E.R. 450.
5 Supra, footnote 1.
6 Morrison: Liability in Negligence For False Statements, (1951) L.Q.RI
67, 69.
7 Clayton v. Woodman, [19613 3 All E.R. 249, aff'd. [1962] 2 Q.B. 533.
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the harm to the nature of the damage suffered: economic loss as dis-
tinct from physical harm.
Here also, the courts had rigidly opposed the extension of liability
because of the overriding fear that this would impose too heavy and
unpredictable a burden on human activity.8 Claims were refused on
the basis that they were too remote. As moral sensitivity increased,
individuals demanded greater protection. As a result the courts enter-
tained claims for economic loss under certain conditions. The concept
of remoteness was rejected and replaced by the more flexible concept
of foreseeability. This permitted the courts to hear actions where the
economic loss was coupled with physical damage to person or prop-
erty.9 But, where the loss suffered was purely economic recovery still
was denied, on the grounds of unforeseeability. The line drawn, as
most writers point out, did not have any basis in reason but simply
reflected the judiciary's fear of unlimited liability.'0 Rather than state
that public policy demanded such limitations they chose instead to
base their decisions on the fallacious grounds of the unforeseeability
of economic damage.1 The principle as such, was seldom questioned;
it was just accepted as law and became a refuge for mechanical
decisions.
Another fetter on judicial action sprang from the contractual
doctrine of privity. The principle of Winterbottom v. Wright12 appar-
ently destroyed by Donoghue v. Stevenson13 was still being applied in
the area of negligent misstatements. Intent on limiting liability the
courts grasped at the doctrine of privity to restrict the duty of care
in a negligence action. Denning L.J. (as he then was) vainly attempt-
ed to point out in Candler v. Crane, Christnas14 the privity had no
place in the law of torts, but his reminder seemed to go largely un-
heeded.
In the landmark case of Hedley, Byrne &. Co. v. HeZler,15 the
House of Lords faced the problems raised squarely.
FACTS
In Hedley, Byrne &, Co. v. Heller's the plaintiffs were advertising
agents who assumed financial responsibility for the advertisement
space they obtained for their clients. The plaintiffs asked their bank
SSeavey: Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promises or Other Conduct, (1951),
64 Har.L.Rev. 913, 919.
9 Seaway Hotels Ltd. v. Gragg Ltd. cg Consumers Gas Company, (1959),
21 D.L.R. (2d) 264.
10 Morrison: Liability in Negligence For False Statements, (1951) L.Q.R.
67. Seavey: Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promise or Other Conduct, (1951) 64
Har. L. Rev. 913. Smith, J.: Liability For Negligent Language, (1901) 14 Har.
L. Rev. 184.
31 Seavey: Reliance Upon Gratuitous Promise or Conduct, (1951) 64 Har.
L. Rev. 913, 921.
12 (1842), 152 E.R. 402.
-3 Supra, footnote 1.
14 [19511 1 All E.R. 426, 431.




to find out if E, one of their clients, had a credit rating sufficient to
meet a commitment of over £8,000. The bank made inquiries of the
Defendant, E's bank. The reference given was that E company was
"believed to be respectably constituted and considered good for its
nominal business engagements." This information was passed on to
the plaintiff by his bank. In reliance on the reference the plaintiffs
expended a large amount of money which they subsequenty lost,
when E went bankrupt.
In an action against the Defendant the plaintiff abandoned all
allegations of fraud and claimed damages on the basis that the report
had been negligently given and as a result of reliance thereon financial
loss was incurred.
PROBLEM BEFORE COURT
The Court of Appeal had in a number of decisions rigidly upheld
the proposition that no duty to take care arises with regard to negli-
gent misstatements resulting in financial loss.1 7 Starting in 1891, they
had inferred from the decision of the House of Lords in Derry v. Peek's
that,
the law of England ... does not consider what a man writes on paper
is like a gun or other dangerous instrument and unless he intended to
deceive the law does not in the absence of contract hold him responsible.19
In Helbut Symon & Co. v. Buckleton2° it was said,
the law must maintain in its full integrity the principle that a person
is not liable in damages for an innocent misrepresentation in what way
or under what form the attack is made.21
The latest approval of the principle came in 1951, in the case of Cand-
ler v. Crane, Christmas.2 2 Thus insofar as the Court of Appeal was
concerned the issue was for all intents and purposes settled.
However, the plaintiffs did not lack authority in attempting to
convince the House of Lords that such a duty should exist.
In Cann v. Willson2 3 money had been advanced by a mortgagee
on the strength of a valuator's report. The report was negligently
made and as a result of reliance upon it the mortgagee lost money.
Chitty, L.J. concluded that there was no contract in existence between
17 Low v. Bowverie, [1891) 3 Ch. 82; LeLievre v. Gould, [1893) 1 Q.B. 491;
Heilbut, Symons & Co. v. Buckleton, [1893) A.C. 30; Heaven v. Pender (1883),
11 Q.B.D. 503; Old Gate Estate Ltd. v. Toplis Harding and RusseL, [1939) 3
All E.R. 209.
18 (1889), 14 A.C. 337.
19 Le Lievre v. Gould, [1893] 1 Q.B. 491, 497.
20 [1913] A.C. 30.
23 Supra, footnote 20, at page 91.
2 2 Supra, footnote 14.
23 (1889) 39 Ch. D. 39.
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the valuator and the mortgagee, but he was prepared to base the
valuator's liability upon negligence. He said,
It seems to me that the Defendants knowingly placed themselves In that
position and in point of law incurred a duty toward him (mortgagee) to
use reasonable care in the preparation of the document called a valua-
tion.24
More recently, and probably the most forceful argument in favour
of the plaintiffs, were the remarks of Denning, L.J. (as he then was)
in his famous dissent in Candler v. Crane, Christmas.25 There he stated
that the decisions in the Court of Appeal on the subject resulted from
a misconception of the law as it then stood and as a result cases such
as Cann v. Willson26 were still the law.
An important consideration in the plaintiff's favour was that al-
though a number of cases had been brought before the House of Lords
concerning statements either negligently or falsely made, not one of
the decisions rendered restricted the Lords in their approach to Hed-
ley, Byrne & Co. v. Heller.27 Whereas the Court of Appeal had taken a
rigid view of Derry v. Peek,28 the Lords consciously strove to point out,
that in their view the question still remained open. In Nocton v. Lord
Ashburton,29 Viscount Haldane stated,
I do not find in Derry v. Peek, an authority for the suggestion that an
action for damages for misrepresentation without an actual intention to
deceive may not lie. What was decided there was that from facts proved
in that case no special duty to be careful in statement could be inferred.
30
Lord Parmoor seconded this view in his concurring judgment noting
that, in his opinion,
The case (Derry v. Peek) ... has no bearing whatever on actions founded
on a breach of duty in which dishonesty is not a necessary factor.
3 1
In the subsequent case of Robinson v. National Bank of Scotland
32
Viscount Haldane reiterated his statements regarding the importance
of Derry v. Peek, 33 and negligent statements in general when he said,
the whole of the doctrines . . . as to duty of care arising from other
special relationships which courts may find to exist in particular cases
still remain.34
Further there existed obiter to the effect that such a duty was capable
of arising, outside contract. In particular, Lord Finlay had stated the
general proposition in Banbury v. Bank of Montreal that
if he (the banker) undertakes to advise he must exercise reasonable
care and skill in giving the advice. He is under no obligation to advise
but if he undertakes to do so he will incur liability if he does so negli-
gently.35
24 Ibid., at p. 42.
25 Supra, footnote 14 at p. 498.
26 (1888), 39 Ch. D. 39.
27 Supra, footnote 3.
28 (1889) 14 A.C. 337.
29 [19141 A.C. 932.
30 Ibid., at p. 955.
31 Ibid., at p. 978.
32 [19161 Scots L.T. Reports 335.
3 3s upra, footnote 28.
34 [19161 Scots L.T. Reports 336, 337.
35 Banbury v. Bank of Montreal, [1918] A.C. 626, 654.
[VOL. 3:77
DECISION
At the trial McNair J. held that in law no greater duty was upon
the Defendants than the general duty of honesty, which was in fact
satisfied and therefore the case was dismissed.36
In the Court of Appeal after a general review of the authorities
binding upon the Court, Pearson, L.J. concluded that in point of fact
Hedley, Byrne & Co. v. Heller, was indistinguishable from the prior
binding authorities of Le Lievre v. Gould37 and Candler v. Crane,
Christmasas and therefore the appeal must be dismissed.39 He con-
cluded that the only circumstances which would permit a court to
establish a duty of care in cases of negligent misrepresentation re-
sulting in financial loss were circumstances either of a contractual or
fiduciary nature.40 In the words of Harman, L.J.,
once the plaintiffs decided to abandon their charge of fraud they had no
hope of success.41
Although the House of Lords affirmed the Court of Appeal deci-
sion, it did so on the basis of the particular facts. However, its reasons
revealed an extension of the general principles involved in negligent
misstatement. In effect they disagreed with the reasoning and logic
of the Court of Appeal.
In assessing the problem the Lords started from the premise that
an innocent but negligent misrepresentation in itself gives no cause
of action. 42 To establish a cause of action the injured party must
prove that the Defendant owed him a duty of care. Up to this point
in their argument the Lords were in complete agreement with the
Court of Appeal. However, the next step taken by the Law Lords was
a step which the Court of Appeal refused to take and necessarily in-
volved overruling a number of appellate decisions.43 The five Lords
unanimously stated that a duty of care could arise outside a con-
tractual or fiduciary relationship if the parties were in sufficient
proximity. In the words of Lord Hodson,
... apart from fiduciary relationships ... there are other circumstances
in which the law imposes a duty to be careful, which is not limited to a
duty to be careful to avoid personal injury or injury to property but
covers a duty to avoid inflicting pecuniary loss.44
HOW THE DUTY EVOLVED
Once it was decided that such a duty existed the task then was
to trace its legal evolution.
3 6 S upra, footnote 3, p. 580.
37 [1893) 1 Q.B. 491.3 s Supra, footnote 14.
39 [1961) 3 All E.R. 891, 896.
40 Ibid., 895.
41 Ibid., 901.4 2 Supra, footnote 3, p. 581.
43 Ibid., at p. 612 where Lord Devlin says:
"In my opinion Le Livre v. Gould and all the decisions based upon its
reasoning can no longer be regarded as authoritative."
44 Ibid., at p. 598.
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Many American jurisdictions had extended the action of deceit
to the situation where the defendant honestly but negligently believes
that he has told the exact truth on the rationale that the duty to
learn of the facts is the equivalent of knowledge of their existence,
or on the basis that the fault is just as great and the reliance of the
plaintiff equally justified in the one as in the other.45 However, the
judiciary in England had rigidly opposed such an extension of the
doctrine. In order to ground an action of deceit there must be scienter
on the part of the defendant. Honest belief in the truth of the state-
ment is a complete defence under all circumstances. 46
Could the duty then be based upon the principle of Donoghue v.
Stevenson?47 If so, this would equate negligent acts and words. Or
was it to be a new mutation of the duty approach based upon words
alone, thus maintaining the distinction between negligent words and
acts? In other words, were the principles of foreseeability and risk
to be applicable equally to words as to deeds or was a new and differ-
ent duty to be created dealing with words alone? It is suggested that
the latter was the route taken by Hedley Byrne v. Heller.
48
At this point a number of important distinctions must be appre-
ciated. The case in question concerns the liability for negligent mis-
statements causing financial damage. It is not concerned with negli-
gent misstatements causing physical damage to person or property,
although several of the Lords made statements concerning the latter.
Lord Hodson said,
I cannot see that there is any valid distinction in this field between a
negligent statement, i.e., an incorrect label on a bottle which leads to
injury, and a negligent compounding of ingredients which leads to the
same result.
49
Further Lord Morris said,
In logic I can see no essential reason for distinguishing injury which is
caused by reliance on words from injury which is caused by the reliance
on the safety of a ship.50
These opinions seem to substantiate the view that where the negligent
misrepresentation results in physical injury the same principles apply
as would be applicable to any other mode of unreasonable conduct.
On the other hand several of the Lords (Lord Hodson, Lord Dev-
lin, Lord Pearce) made statements to the effect that there should be
no distinction between financial damage and physical damage. Lord
Hodson states that,
it is difficult to see why liability as such should depend upon the nature
of the damage.S1
45 Prosser: Torts, Cases and Materia, p. 950.4 6 Fleming: Law of Torts (lInd Ed.) 600.
47 Supra, footnote 1.4 8 Supra, footnote 3.
49 Ibid., at p. 596.
50 Ibid., at p. 590.
25 Ibid., at p. 598.
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Lord Devlin is even more emphatic in his condemnation of the dis-
tinction:
the interposition of the physical injury is said to make a difference in
principle, I can find neither logic or common sense in this ... I am bound
to say my Lords that I think this is nonsense.52
If all of these statements were literally accepted, the logical con-
clusion would seem to be that the principles applicable to cases such
as Donoghue v. Stevenson53 would be equally applicable to cases such
as Hedley, Byrne c Co. v. Heller.54 But the judgments show this is not
the case.
Not one of the Lords concluded that negligent misstatements
should be treated in the same manner as negligent acts where the
damage complained of is similar to that in Hedley, Byrne & Co. v.
HeZler.
In fact Lord Reid and Lord Pearce were quite vigorous in their
determination to ensure that the distinction between the two should
continue. To Lord Pearce the reason for distinguishing was clear,-
negligence in words creates different problems from negligence in
acts. 55 The other three members of the court were equally emphatic
in their insistence that Donoghue v. Stevenson was inapplicable to the
case under discussion.5 6
It appears that the Lords, although anxious to rid themselves of
the idea that relief should not be dependent upon the nature of the
damage suffered, and confronted with the proposition that there is
in fact no distinction between an act and word causing physical harm,
refused to apply the principles of one to the facts of the other. Public
policy demanded liability for negligent statement but judicial dis-
cretion demanded greater limitations than were inherent in the "neigh-
bour doctrine" of Lord Atkin.
57
This dilemma can be and is in fact resolved in Hedley, Byrne & Co.
v. Helter is regarded as- establishing a new field of liability under the
law of negligence-an area confined to negligent words and extending
to financial loss as distinct from physical injury.
If this is the result, then the application of Donoghue v. Steven-
son 58 illustrates how the law can be developed to solve particular
problems. In the words of Lord Devlin,
the general conception (principle of proximity) can be used to produce
other categories in the same way. An existing category grows as instances
of its application multiply until the time comes when the cell divides. The
field is very different but the object of the search is still the same.59
52 Ibid., at p. 603.
53 Supra, footnote 1.
54 Supra, footnote 3.
55 Ibid., at p. 613.
56 Ibid., at p. 575, 608, and 615.
57 Supra, footnote 1,
58 Ibid.
59 Supra, footnote 3 at p. 607.
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Lord Pearce expressed similar views when he said, "Donoghue v.
Stevenson . . .affords some analogy from the broad outlook which
it imposed on the law relating to physical negligence."
60
Similarly Denning L.J. (as he then was) in Candler v. Crane,
Christmass1 used the neighbour or proximity principle for the pur-
pose of showing that a new duty should and could be created. He does
not use it to measure the scope and extent of the duty itself, when
he introduces the concept of knowledge rather than foreseeability.
Having thus created the duty, the Lords then set out to establish
its boundaries.
BY WHOM IS THE DUTY OWED
It would seem from the authorities, that the duty would cover
skilled persons whose opinions are normally relied on by people in
making financial decisions. Denning L.J. (as he then was), suggested
in the Candler case that the persons concerned are,
such persons ... whose profession or occupation it is to examine books
... and make reports on which other people, other than their clients
rely on in the ordinary course of business.6 2
This view appears to have gained acceptance in Hedley, Byrne d Co.
v. He7ler. In the words of Lord Pearce,
if persons holding themselves out in a calling or profession take on a
task within that profession they have a duty of skill and care. In terms
of proximity one might say they are in particular close proximity to
those who they know are relying on their skill and care although the
proximity is not contractual. 63
The analogy with the duty of those in public callings is striking but
the law on that subject is burdened with too much subtle learning to
provide more than a rough guide for a duty situation in negligence.
64
However, by using the analogy of public calling as a guide the exact
parties or classes under such a duty can be identified in a general
way. The accountant in Candler v. Crane, Christmas,65 the valua-
tor in Cann v. Wiflson,66 and the surveyor in LeLievre v. Gould
67
would most certainly fall within such a class. In the United States
liability has been imposed upon public weighers,68 doctors,69 abstrac-
tors, 70 and lawyers.71
60 Ibid., at p. 615.
61 Hewston: Donoghue v. Stevenson in Retrospect (1957) 20 Mod. L. Rev.
1, 19.62 Supra, footnote 14 at p. 433.
63 Supra, footnote 3 at p. 616.
64 Wilson, Chattels and Certificates in Law of Negligence (1952) 15 Mod.
L. Rev. 160, 166.65 Supra, footnote 14.
66 (1888) 39 Ch. D. 39.
67 [1893] 1 Q.B. 491.
68 Glanzer v. Shephard (1922) 233 N.Y. 236.69 Edwards v. Lamb (1899) 69 N. H. 599.
7O Dickle v. Abstracted Company (1890), 89 Tenn., 431.
71 Biakanja v. Irving (1962), 49 Cal. 2d., 647.
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The exact depiction, however, of the classes to which the duty will
extend is unnecessary for the reason that one of the main defences
to an action of this type will be the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff. The defendant would in all probability argue that since he
was not a member of a professional class his opinion should not have
been relied on by a reasonable man and the plaintiff was "volenti".
In the American case of Varton Garopedian Inc. v. Anderson72 it was
said,
But even if such a duty were held to exist the Defendant would be entitled
to a directed verdict since the plaintiff had failed to sustain the proof on
the issue of contributory negligence ... the plaintiff placed reliance on
the reports merely because he understood the Defendant was a 'promin-
ent citizen' and 'dressed nice'73
But just sticking the defendant in the proper pigeon hole will not
in itself attract liability.
CIRCUMSTANCES WHEN "CLASS" LIABLE
Is the banker to be liable for "kerbstone" comment given at a
social gathering or is liability only to extend to a careful and well
prepared report? On the authorities it appears that the duty to take
care would not arise out of casual and unguarded comment.
In the case of Fish v. Kelly 4 the plaintiff casually asked the
Defendant, a solicitor, about his rights under a deed which the De-
fendant had earlier drawn up for the plaintiff's employer. Relying
on an erroneous recollection the Defendant gave an answer. In a
subsequent negligence action, the Defendant was held not liable on
the basis that,
If this sort of action could be maintained it would be extremely hazardous
for an attorney to venture to give an opinion upon any point of law in
the course of a journey by Railway . . . I am unable to perceive any duty
arising out of the casual conversation here.7 5
Denning L.J. (as he then was) expressed similar feelings, in
Candler v. Crane, Christmas76 when he said,
a scientist or expert is not liable to his readers for careless statements
in his published works for he publishes simply for the purpose of giving
information and not with any transaction in mind at all.77
As a consequence it would appear the statements relied on must
arise from the conscious utilization of the skill which the professional
man possesses. Further
the representation must normally concern a business or professional
transaction whose nature makes clear the gravity of the inquiry and
the importance and influence attached to the answer.7 8
72 (1943) 31 A 2d 371.
73 Ibid., at p. 374.
74 (1864) 144 E.R. 78.
75 Ibid., at p. 83.76 Supra, footnote 14.7 7 Ibid., at p. 434.78 Supra, footnote 3 at p. 617.
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In Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller7 9 there was considerable doubt
as to whether a banker's reference of the type submitted by the defend-
ant would satisfy the above requirements. Three of the Lords (Lord
Reid, Lord Morris, Lord Hodson) infer that the amount of time and
effort which the bank would be expected to spend in compiling such a
reference would place no higher duty on the bank than one of honesty.
Of the three, Lord Reid and Lord Morris refuse to express a concrete
opinion stating only that if the question arose in a future case it
would be difficult to place a duty of care on the banks for such a
reply.80
Lord Hodson states that to place a higher duty upon banks than
the general duty of honesty would under the circumstances be un-
warranted.81 The replies made to such inquiries are impromptu
answers, and not the result of searching records and studying docu-
ments, and the inquirer would be unreasonable in expecting anything
more.
The two other Lords, Lord Devlin and Lord Pearce do not specific-
ally address their minds to the question, but Lord Pearce seems to
assume that the making of an inquiry of the type in this case is in-
sufficient to raise a duty of care.
In the case of Robinson v. National Bank of Scotland,8 2 a refer-
ence similar to the Hedley case was given by the bank. In a subsequent
action for negligence Viscount Haldane said,
when a mere inquiry is made by one banker of another who stands in
no special relation to him, then in the absence of special circumstances
from which a contract to be careful can be inferred I think there is no
duty excepting the duty of honesty.8 3
What should the court look to in determining whether, under the
circumstances prevailing, a duty of care exists on the professional
man? Should it place primary emphasis upon the intended reliance
of the beneficiary or should the professional's knowledge that his skill
is being relied on be the governing factor? On the basis of the above
statements it would appear that the latter principle is to be preferred.
In both Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heer84 and Robinson v. National
Bank8 5 the ultimate beneficiary intended to rely on the report to a
great extent but since this intended reliance was not transmitted to the
defendant no duty other than that of honesty would arise.
If at the time the defendant undertakes to do the work, he is
made aware of the intended reliance to be placed upon his skill, and
he undertakes to provide it without limiting his liability then clearly
a duty of care would arise. Furthermore, knowing that his skill was
7 9 Ibid.
SOIbid., at p. 584 (Lord Reid), and p. 594 (Lord Morriss).
81 Ibid., at p. 600.
82 (1916) Scots L.T.R. 336.
83 Ibid., at p. 337.
84 Supra, footnote 3.
S5 Bupra, footnote 82.
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Notes
being relied upon the defendant would in all probability charge for
his service and the report that he submits will be the
result of expending time and trouble in searching records, studying docu-
ments, weighing and comparing the favourable and unfavourable.86
Thus when determining whether the circumstances of the particular
case give rise to a duty of care it would prove beneficial to look to
the nature of the report actually made, and the consideration received
on the basis that when a lengthy report is made and a high fee charged
it is usually done by the maker in the knowledge that it will be relied
on. In Candler v. Crane, Christmas7 a fee was paid by the company
concerned to the accountants, whereas in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Hell-
er8s the work was to all intents and purposes gratuitously undertaken
by the one bank for the benefit of the other. In the words of Lord
Devlin,
where there is no consideration it will be necessary to exercise greater
care in distinguishing between social and professional relationships.8 9
EXTENT OF DUTY
From the decided cases it appears that the plaintiff must estab-
lish both that the Defendant knew that his skill was being relied on,
and also that he knew the specific transaction for which his skill was
going to be used. Denning, L.J. (as he then was) in Candler v. Crane,
Christmas9O said,
... it (the duty) only extends to those transactions which the Defendant
knew their accounts were required... the duty extends only to the very
transaction in mind at the time.91
Logically, it is hard to understand why such a restriction should be
imposed upon the duty. If the defendant is aware of the reliance placed
upon the report by the plaintiff, then why should he be allowed to
avoid liability because the plaintiff used the report for a transaction
slightly different than that which he contemplated?
The American Restatement, S552, in describing the duty is not
as restrictive as Denning L.J. It states that liability would extend,
... to transactions in which it was intended to influence his (the plain-
tiff's) conduct or in a transaction substantially identical therewith.92
The extension under the Restatement is more reasonable since it gives
the plaintiff certain freedom in his conduct arising from the report
but does not allow him to depart completely from the purpose for
which the report was made.
It is difficult to understand why Denning L.J. departed from the
Restatement at this juncture, for up to this point in his judgment he
86 Supra, footnote 3 at p. 617.87 Supra, footnote 14.
8s Supra, footnote 3.
89 Ibid., at p. 617.9o Supra, footnote 14.
91 Ibid., at p. 435.
92 Restatement of Torts, Ch. 22, S. 552, 112.
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appears to rely heavily upon the principles enunciated therein. This
probably results from a conscious attempt to recognize a duty in situa-
tions such as the one before him, yet at the same time to keep the
incidence of liability within strict controls lest it create an impossible
burden out of all proportion to the fault involved.
TO WHOM DOES THE DUTY EXTEND
The possible liability which might result from the communica-
tion of a statement to remote plaintiffs is so great and may be so far
out of proportion to the fault involved that there is a general agree-
ment that a more restricted rule is necessary in the case of economic
loss than where there is tangible harm to property.93 As noted this
more restricted rule requires actual knowledge on the part of the
Defendant rather than the principle of foreseeability of risk as is
applicable to negligent acts. The Defendant must not only know that
his skill is being relied upon, know the transaction in which such skill
is going to be used, but it also seems that he must know the person
who is going to rely upon his skill. In the words of Denning, L.5., the
duty is owed "to their employer or client, and to any third person to
whom they themselves show the account or to whom they know their
employer is going to show the account. ' 94 It is worth observing that
the words "ought to know" are expressly omitted from the above.
In Hedley, Byrne & Co. v. He~ler95 the Defendants were not aware
either of the purpose of the inquiry nor of the identity of the party
intending to rely on it. But in the words of Lord Reid:
... they know that the advertisement was in connection with an ad-
vertising contract and it was at least probable that the information was
wanted by the advertising contractors. It seems to me quite immaterial
that they did not know who these contractors were.96
Lord Morris seems to deny that knowledge is a requirement:
... the fact that the person to whom the answers would in all probability
be passed on was unnamed and unknown to the bank is not important.97
This statement must be read in light of the fact that the bank knew
the inquiries were made in regard to advertising contracts.
So too in Robinson v. National Bank of Scotland98 a case which
Lord Reid considered nearly indistinguishable from Hedley Byrne &
Co. v. He~ler, Lord Dundas stated in regard to the question of Knowl-
ledge:
the question then becomes whether or not the pursuer can fairly be
regarded as belonging to the 'class' within the scope and contemplation
of the letter.9 9
9 3 Prosser, Law of Torts, fInd Ed., 543.9 4 Supra, footnote 14 at p. 434.
95 Supra, footnote 3.
96 Ibid., at p. 580.
97 Ibid., at p. 588.
98 (1916) Scots L.T.R. 336.
99 Ibid., at p. 67.
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And later in the report:
If it is to be assumed that the letter was in fact obtained through the S
bank on behalf of the pursuer though his identity and, very existence
were unknown to the Defendant I should answer the question in the
affirmative.100
On the actual facts of the case the pursuer did not become a party
to the transaction until after the time the letter had been sent and
as a result was not a member of the protected class.
However, even if the above statements are strictly read they
are not as stringent in their requirements as that of Denning L.J. in
Candler. If the Defendant had knowledge of a restricted class of per-
sons who might rely upon the report, this would seem sufficient to
satisfy Lord Reid, Lord Morris and Lord Dundas. If this be the case
then in this aspect of the duty the position of the British and Ameri-
can courts would coincide. In the American Restatement, the harm
must be suffered "by the person or one of the class of persons for
whose guidance the report was supplied."'u 0
However, it is submitted "class of persons" must be a very re-
stricted class and not all inclusive such as investors. Cardozo, J. in
Glanzer v. Shlephard said:
The Defendant weighed and certified at the order of one with the very
end and aim of shaping the conduct of another. Diligence was owing not
only to him who ordered but also to him who relied.' 0 2
In another of Cardozo J.'s judgments, Ultramares Corporation v.
Tache,103 the Defendants who were a firm of public accountants
certified a balance sheet for use by a company to obtain credit. The
balance sheet was negligently prepared and as a result the plaintiffs
lost money by relying upon it. The Defendant did not know the
persons to whom it would be shown or the extent or number of
transactions in which it would be used, nor did they know of the
existence of the plaintiff. The action was dismissed on the basis that
to hold the Defendants liable, ". . . may expose accountants to a
liability in an indeterminate amount for an indefinite time to an
indeterminate class."'01 4 Glanzer v. Shephard0 5 was distinguished
upon the ground that the transmission of the weigher's certificate
to the plaintiff was not merely one possibility among many.
Hence it would appear that in order for a duty to arise either
one of two situations must exist: the Defendant must (1) know the
person who is going to rely on his statement or (2) know that the
report was being prepared for a specific purpose and was intended
to be relied on by a certain class of persons.
The similarity to the action of deceit in this respect is striking.
In an action for deceit the plaintiff must establish that the defendant
intended him to rely upon the statement and that in fact he did. As
100 Ibid., at p. 67.
101 Restatement of Torts, Ch. 22, s. 552, 122.
102 (1922) 233 N.Y. 236, 240.
103 (1931) 255 N.Y. 170.
104 Ibid., at p. 174.
1o5 Supra, footnote 102.
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in the case of negligent misrepresentation, the principle of foresee-
ability has been held to have no application. One of the great difficul-
ties in an action of this type is to distinguish merely foreseeable con-
sequences from actual intended reliance. The simple fact that the
defendant as a reasonable man should have realized the likelihood
that the plaintiff might rely on it to his detriment is not sufficient;
reliance must have been intended. In addition, in the action of deceit
the intended reliance of the defendant is applicable to a restricted
class as well as to the individual. In the leading case of Peek v. Gurney
it was held that a company prospectus is ordinarily addressed only to
the members of the public who are invited to take up shares from
the company itself and does not avail an investor who purchased his
shares in the market from another shareholder. 106
FURTHER LIMITATIONS UPON THE DUTY
If one of the important elements in ascertaining whether the
parties are in a special relationship which gives rise to a duty of care
is knowledge by the defendant that reliance will be placed upon his
skills, then liability could be avoided if the defendant states he will
not be responsible for any reliance put on his statement.
Lord Devlin puts it thus:
A man cannot be said voluntarily to be undertaking a responsibility If at
the very moment when he is said to be accepting it he declares that In
fact he is not.10
7
In Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller'0 8 an exculpatory clause was in-
cluded in the reply given, to the effect that the report was made in
strictest confidence and without responsibility. It would be improper
to equate this clause to a contractual exculpatory clause. The latter
operates when a duty is found to exist and has the effect of discharg-
ing the duty. In Hedley Byrne & Co. v. He7ler10 9 the crucial question
was whether a duty ever existed. The clause was relied on to show that
when the information was given by the defendants they expressly
rejected liability resulting from reliance. The Lords unanimously
agreed that the rejection of liability effectively enabled the bank to
prevent any duty arising. Such clauses are standard in forms used
by Canadian banks.110
lo6 Fleming: Law of Torts, IInd Ed., p. 606.
107 Supra, footnote 3 at p. 613.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce
"The following information is given in confidence and for your exclusive
use upon the express understanding and agreement that neither the
writer nor this bank shall incur any liability for or by reason of giving
the same, or any error therein or omission therefrom; also upon the
express condition that if you communicate the same or any part thereof
you will indemnify the writer and this Bank from any consequent lia-
bility."
Royal Bank of Canada
"This information in this letter is furnished at your request for your
personal use only and in strictest confidence. It is not to be taken as
a representation or guarantee of any kind whatsoever and neither the
Bank nor the writer incurs any liability in furnishing it."
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Another possible limitation upon the action is the obvious difficul-
ties the Courts will have in recognizing the existence of negligence.
In Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller the trial judge found that if a
duty of care existed the defendants were negligent. This finding was
disputed in the House of Lords but was not dealt with directly as the
decision was based on other grounds. However, one of the Lords, Lord
Reid commented upon the finding of the trial judge when he said:
what the appellants complain of is not negligence in the ordinary sense
of carelessness but rather misjudgment in that H. while honestly seeking
to give a fair assessment in fact made a statement which gave a false and
misleading impression.'1 1
In the case of a professional man negligence could arise in three ways.
Either he is negligent in ascertaining the facts, in transmitting the
facts to his principal, or in drawing inferences from the facts them-
selves. The bank would not be negligent simply because it was wrong
or because its employees failed to exercise some extraordinary care
and skill. The obligation of the bank in all three respects would be
to use the ordinary care and skill which the normal bank uses in
answering such inquiries.
The plaintiff's onus would be to establish the standard of banks
in regard to the transaction in question. Once having obtained evi-
dence of the custom of the trade then resort could be had to the
particular event in dispute. Was the report compiled by the Defendant
obtained in accordance with the general standard of the whole pro-
fession? If so, then the question would become, were the facts negli-
gently transmitted to the plaintiff or was the inference drawn from
the compiled facts negligently made?
In regard to the latter the fact that it is merely an error in judg-
ment will not per se exonerate the defendant. The question will be,
has he exercised the quality of judgment to be reasonably expected
of a reasonable man in his profession?
SETTING IN CANADA
On August 2, 1963, less than two months after the decision had
been reported in Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller was applied in a Cana-
dian court. flsley, J. of the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia adopted
"the principles" of law as therein set out. However, in his great
enthusiasm to adopt the principles he did not in fact establish what
they were and what application they had to the case before him.112
Prior to this, the number of Canadian cases in which the problem
arose was negligible and to a great extent any opinions expressed
were in strict compliance with the approach in England. In the case of
Olmstead v. Pearce & Co..'-'3 the plaintiff, who was not a client of the
"'Bupra, footnote 3 at p. 584.
( 12 Reid v. Traders GeneraZ Insurance Co., Dares Motors Ltd. and Myers
(1964) 41 D.L.R. 2d, 148.
iii [1937J 1 D.L.R. 625.
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defendant, asked the defendant stock brokers to obtain a stock quota-
tion for him. The defendant obtained the requisite information and
transmitted it to the plaintiff, who attempted to pay the defendant
for the services, but payment was refused. As it later turned out, the
information was incorrect.
In a subsequent action for negligence, Hogg C.J. said,
the Defendants rested their defence on the well known principle of law
established by Derry v. Peek that a person is not liable for a false repre-
sentation upon the faith of which another person acts even though such
representation is carelessly made provided it was made honesfly.114
Later in the report he says:
the principles upon which in my opinion this case must be decided is that
laid down in Derry v. Peek.11 5
and accordingly he dismissed the action.
However, after the Court of Appeal decided the case of Candler
v. Crane, Christmas1 16 a reaction to the decision arose in Canada.
Numerous articles appeared criticizing the position taken by the
court and this criticism was to a small extent exhibited in the few
decisions on the topic since 1951.117
Probably the best known decision on negligent misstatement in
Canada is that of Guay v. Sun Publishers"s decided by the Supreme
Court of Canada in 1952. Although the action was concerned with
physical damage resulting from the negligent statement there is
obiter expressed by the justices on the question under discussion.
Chief Justice Kerwin said:
While there are traces in some quarters of a distinction being drawn be-
tween damages for injuries to a person in body or mind or damages to
a person's property on the one hand and economic loss on the other, there
would appear to be difficulty in ascertaining a sound basis for such a
distinction.11 9
Of the other four Justices, three refused to comment upon the Candler
decision and only Locke J. categorically repudiated the existence of
any duty of care in words leading to economic loss.
In the recent case of Boyd v. Ackley 120 the plaintiffs sold a com-
pany which had previously retained the defendant as its chartered
accountant and asked him to prepare a statement of the debts of
the company which the plaintiffs had agreed to assume as a condi-
tion of the sale. Because of the defendant's negligence an erroneous
statement was prepared and the plaintiffs overpaid $1,400.00. In the
114 Ibid., at p. 633.
115 Ibid., at p. 637.116 Supra, footnote 14.
117 Paton: Liability in Torts For Negligent Statement, 25 Can. Bar Rev.
123. Fridman: Negligence By Words, 32 Can. Bar Rev. 638.
118 Guay v. Sun Publishers, [1952] D.L.R. 479. See also (1963) 41 Can.
Bar Rev. 602, for a discussion of the effect of Hedley Byrne v. Heller on
Guay v. Sun Publishers.
l9 Guay v. Sun Publishers, [1952] D.L.R. 479, 481.
120 (1962) 32 D.L.R. (2d) 77.
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subsequent action, the court concluded that there was in fact a con-
tract in existence between the parties. However, in a dictum it was
said,
if it had been necessary to decide whether the defendant owed the plain-
tiff a duty of care apart from contract, I think that I would have been
inclined to hold that under the circumstances there was such a duty. The
Candler case is distinguishable. The plaintiff at the time the information
was given had no connection with the Company.121
The importance of the above lies in the fact that the court recognized
that a duty could exist outside contract. Probably unintentionally,
the court had, by stating this proposition, ruled impliedly that Le
Lievre v. Gould"22 and the other Court of Appeal decisions based
upon it were wrong, and therefore rather than distinguish Candler
v. Crane, Christmas-3 the court should have stated that it was
not valid law and would not be followed in Canada.
As Boyd v. Ackley" 24 was the last reported case to arise before
Hedley Byrne & Co. v. HeZler,25 there was no judicial reactions re-
corded to the approach of the British Columbia Court, and to the ques-
tion whether the proposition stated, similar, in many respects to that
in Hedley Byrne would have been followed, or rejected.
CONCLUSION
Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heler"-6 has finally established that liability
may exist for negligent misstatement resulting in economic loss out-
side of a contractual or fiduciary relationship. However, in establish-
ing the duty the court has been careful to confine it within rigid
boundaries. The plaintiff must in any action establish:
(a) the defendant was a professional or skilled man acting in his
professional capacity.
(b) the defendant knew that the work he was to do was going
to be relied upon by the plaintiff, or knew that the party
with whom he contracted was going to pass it on to a cus-
tomer or other person who was going to rely upon it.
(c) the defendant undertook to do the work without any qualifi-
cation.
(d) the defendant knew the exact transaction or a transaction
nearly identical therewith in which the work was to be used.
(e) the report was in fact relied upon by the plaintiff and he
suffered economic loss thereby.
(f) the Defendant was negligent in the preparation of the report.
These limitations are understandable. As befits the law which is
no idle exercise, creative imagination must submit to the cautious
discipline of experience.
121 Ibid., at p. 80.
122 [1893] 1 Q.B. 491.
"3 [1951) 1 All E.R. 426.
32A [1962] 32 D.L.R. 77.
325 S upra, footnote 14.
126 Ibid.
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